



Soldiers from B Company, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor (B/2-69 AR), Task Force 1-10, guard a suspected insurgent's house in the Baqubah Province 5 March 2005.

Photo by SPC J'mil Watts, 55th Signal Company (Combat Camera)

## 3rd ID: 1-10 FA as a Maneuver and Fires Task Force in OIF III

In April 2005, Task Force 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery (TF 1-10), *The Rock's Support*, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3rd ID), raided multiple houses and then cleared a palm grove in detail in a rural area just south of the city of Baqubah, Iraq, on the edge of the Diyala River. B Company, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor (B/2-69 AR), *Bayonet*, was the task force's main effort with A/1-10 FA, *Automatic Steel*, and B/1-30 IN, *Bull*, in support. The multi-house raid went off "without a hitch," and we detained 30 personnel, including three mid-level Al Qaeda members who were using the area as a safe haven.

But once *Bayonet* began clearing the

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palm grove, things got more exciting. As the company moved toward the riverbank, it came under mortar attack. *Bull* moved into the palm grove on the other side of the river to begin to search for the mortar team and quickly came under small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire. The company fire support officer (FSO) initiated a danger-close call for fire (CFF) for the troops-

in-contact. Immediately after that CFF, *Bayonet* and the TF tactical command post (TAC) called for danger-close fires on their side of the river. 2nd Platoon, B/1-10 (*Big Guns*) fired 12 rounds of 155-mm high explosive (HE) in support of *Bull* and *Bayonet*. Immediately after the impact, attack aviation and close air support (CAS) arrived to support the TF. The enemy was killed, and the TF suffered no casualties.

During this mission, TF 1-10 commanded and employed two infantry companies, an FA battery serving as a motorized infantry company, a cannon firing platoon, attack aviation and CAS in a successful offensive combat operation. Complex operations such as this



- **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance**—Captured more than 200 insurgents (including 27 high-value individuals).
- **Combat Operations**—Conducted more than 3,500 combat patrols and more than 230 raids.
- **Security and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) Development**—Trained more than 3,600 Iraqis as policemen, provided security for 52 polling sites during the constitutional referendum and the national elections (65 percent voter turnout with no polling site attacks), and expanded the ISF presence into previous anti-Iraqi force- (AIF)-controlled areas.
- **Civil Military Operations**—Invested more than \$60 million in projects to increase the quality of life for the citizens of Baqubah, completed more than 70 major reconstruction projects (brought fresh water to 100,000 people, expanded electric services, rebuilt schools and clinics, and established an area-wide waste management program), established the first local government charter and created local government budgets.
- **Information Operations**—Distributed more than 25,000 fliers and pamphlets to the Iraqi citizens and conducted joint Coalition Force/ISF operations to engage the local populace and encourage public confidence in the ISF and Iraqi government.

#### Task Force 1-10 Lines of Operations Achievements in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III

one epitomized TF 1-10's experience as a maneuver and fires task force during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III.

From January 2005 to January 2006, TF 1-10's mission was challenging, requiring a unique reconfiguration. 1-10 FA, a 155-mm Paladin battalion, added a mechanized infantry company, a tank platoon and an engineer company from the 3rd BCT to maximize its ability to engage the enemy in full-spectrum operations. Charged with operating as a maneuver unit conducting full-spectrum operations, TF 1-10 also served as the direct support (DS) artillery battalion for the 3rd BCT in and around Baqubah employing one cannon firing platoon and the organic Q-37 radar. This unique combination of maneuver and fires units under the command of an artillery battalion proved successful in one of the "hot spots" of Iraq.

**Demographics of Area of Operations (AO) Rock.** AO Rock was about 80 square miles, centered on the city of Baqubah. The population of Baqubah is about 400,000 people. Buhriz, the city just to its south, has nearly 50,000. Located about 40 miles north of Baghdad on the eastern edge of the Sunni Triangle, Baqubah and Buhriz are ethnically diverse, creating both opportunities and challenges.

The suburbs to the north of Baqubah, known as Huwaydir, are almost 100 percent Shiite. Buhriz is about 90 percent Sunni. Throughout the major districts of Baqubah, Sunni and Shiite each comprise about 40 percent with

Kurd and other ethnic groups comprising the other 20 percent. Each sect has mosques throughout the city, often in areas where the surrounding populace is of another sect.

There is minimal tribal influence in the urban areas but more tribal influence in the surrounding countryside and rural areas with less governmental control.

**Lines of Operations (LOOs).** To accomplish its mission, the task force organized along LOOs: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); combat operations; security and Iraqi security forces (ISF) development; civil-military operations (CMO); and information operations (IO). Each LOO was critical to TF 1-10's success.

One of the greatest challenges in Iraq was the continual transition from combat operations to IO to developing ISF and the government. These full-spectrum operations required the task force to transition quickly from combat to non-combat operations. Rapid transitions in full-spectrum operations are critical to succeed in the current fight for Iraq.

During TF 1-10's OIF III deployment, combat operations were shaping operations. The decisive operations were those that developed the Iraqi government and helped it protect the people of Iraq. Success came through carefully synchronized progress in *all* LOOs.

The TF conducted combat operations to reduce the number of insurgents in the AO and allow the ISF to train and build combat power. The stronger and more

capable ISF ensured the government could develop and become secure, leading to an increase in the quality of life in the area through the increased ability to manage reconstruction projects. IO supported all of these efforts.

Focusing on the right tasks at the right times makes the LOO cycle effective. This is part of the tactical defeat mechanism of *disintegrating* anti-Iraqi force (AIF) capabilities, *eroding* AIF resources and *dislocating* the AIF from its supporters that the 3rd BCT used throughout OIF III to great success.

To track the LOOs, we held a weekly targeting and effects meeting and used a modified effects-based operations (EBO) model from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. For each LOO, we identified the goals and tasks to achieve those goals. During the meeting, we reviewed the status of the tasks and adjusted plans and operations to achieve goals in each LOO. See the figure for TF 1-10's achievement by LOOs.

**ISR.** The first step in developing an ISR plan that met the commander's intent was to identify the internal and external collection assets available to the TF. Internally, TF 1-10 had roughly 650 Soldiers (every Soldier is a collector), six Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), local contacts who came to the forward operating base (FOB), interpreters, local national workers, many key local leaders or spheres of influence (SOIs) and, for the first six months of the deployment, a tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team of two Soldiers. The civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams also worked internally as passive collectors. Externally, the TF received daily Shadow UAV coverage from the BCT and several higher level, sensitive collection assets.

Because of the small, but highly populated area of responsibility (AOR), the TF covered most named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) daily but covered some NAIs only weekly. NAIs were based on key terrain and enemy activity in an area. The TF's TAIs targeted improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements and indirect fire teams based on areas in which the enemy had good distant aiming points (DAPs) for indirect fire attacks and access to heavily trafficked routes for conducting IED attacks.

To prioritize assets to cover the NAIs and TAIs, the TF conducted an extensive

pattern analysis. This analysis affected our patrol schedule; terrain denial fires; use of aerial surveillance platforms, such as the Ravens and Shadows; and requests for fixed- and rotary-wing air support. Continuously adjusting the patrol schedule made us more unpredictable and allowed us to interdict many attacks.

Aggressively using as many assets as possible greatly reduced the enemy's ability to attack. The more assets in sector covering NAIs and TAIs, the harder it was for the enemy to operate.

We integrated the ISR plan into combat operations during the weekly targeting and effects meeting.

The TF S2 gave commanders the most likely locations for enemy activities weekly, based on the pattern analysis, historical information and HUMINT data. He developed graphs showing the location, type of attack, time of day, day of the week or month, lunar data, sunrise and sunset times, key events and historical data from previous units operating in the area. The TF maintained a daily record of every significant event in a story-board format.

**Combat Operations.** For any unit in Iraq, combat operations are high-risk.

Because of the lack of initial training and our senior NCOs' limited maneuver experience, we emphasized rehearsals, pre-combat checks (PCCs), pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and refresher training. Combat operations included raids, cordon and searches, flash traffic checkpoints, sniper operations, terrain denial (using indirect fires and patrols), and daily route clearance and (or) counter-mortar patrols.

Using 155-mm fires for terrain denial and psychological operations were major parts of our offensive operations. We used schedules of fire to proactively deny the enemy the use of likely IED sites and indirect fire launch sites. During one 16-day period in June-July 2005, we fired 155-mm HE rounds into the palm groves on the western edge of the town of Buhriz every 15 minutes from 2300 to 0600 hours to deny terrain to the AIF. This also had the effect of disrupting the Buhriz locals and encouraging them not to support or tolerate the AIF.

The TF conducted most of its combat operations jointly with the ISF, often with both the Iraqi police and army. These operations posed many challenges and, in large part, succeeded because of constant

coordination and rehearsals.

At first, the ISF played a supporting role during these joint combat operations, but by the time the TF redeployed, ISF leaders planned and executed most missions. The near incident-free constitutional referendum in October, the peaceful and successful national elections in December and many successful Iraqi-led combat operations demonstrated the ISF's credible capability to take responsibility for security in and around Baqubah.

**Security and ISF Development.** TF 1-10 formed partnerships with the two Iraqi army companies and four Iraqi police units in AO Rock. This partnership included training and logistics support, joint operations and coordination of all security matters.

The key to success in partnering with and developing the ISF units was the strong personal relationships each TF leader established with the Iraqi leaders. Daily interaction on formal and informal levels was critical.

In February 2005, TF 1-10 received the task of training and developing the Iraqi police force in the Diyala Province with its headquarters in Baqubah. Led by the TF S3, a small team of officers

## Lessons Learned by TF 1-10

The following lessons learned and recommendations are based on Task Force 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery's (TF 1-10's) experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III while serving as a maneuver and fires task force in Baqubah, Iraq.

**Conduct refresher training.** Often platoons had little time to prepare for missions as they received orders to raid buildings over the radio, allowing no time for planning or rehearsals. Conducting weekly training on this type of operation reduced the risks caused by the inability to conduct formal rehearsals before missions. Although a platoon may not have rehearsed on the day of the mission, it had rehearsed the basics within the past week and was ready to complete the mission.

**Establish reliable contacts.** Reliable contacts were hard to come by, so surveillance was poor at the beginning of the deployment. However, toward the end, the relationships with local spheres of influence (SOIs) and contacts had grown, and the task force had a better understanding of what was going on in the city. It was important to establish a contact in every

part of the city.

In many cases our contacts gave us early warnings of enemy activities via cell phones. It seemed like everyone had a cell phone in Iraq, and many were camera phones.

**Establish habitual relationships with Iraqi security forces (ISF) for combat operations.** Planning and executing missions with the ISF posed several challenges, much the same as those faced when US joint forces work together. At first, the ISF brought fewer soldiers and policemen than expected. The personnel often were from different platoons or even different companies. The lack of unit integrity degraded the ability to train a platoon to competence on a task. To combat this challenge, the TF initiated a partnership between US and Iraqi platoon leaders or police officers, creating a habitual relationship between the organizations.

**Train vehicle-mounted gunnery.** Not all the Soldiers in TF 1-10 took part in convoy live fires in pre-deployment training because of resource constraints. However, each Soldier rode in a convoy

at some time during the tour in Iraq.

Leaders should ensure that critical training events emphasize vehicle-mounted gunnery in motorized infantry units before deployment. This will prepare Soldiers to fire crew-served weapons mounted on the top of their vehicles.

**Change the FA battalion MTOEs.** Based on our experiences during OIF, 1-10 FA recommends more robust S2 and S5 sections—add one military intelligence captain and one intelligence analyst to the S2 and one captain, one lieutenant, one sergeant first class and two enlisted men to the S5. Also, every battery needs a battery executive officer.

Adding these to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) would make the S2 and S5 sections more functional in the FA battalion and provide batteries an additional officer needed for maneuver operations. It would preclude our having to move officers, senior NCOs and Soldiers (all in critical jobs within the battalion) into positions they are untrained for.



Photo by SPC Jmil Watts, 56th Signal Company (Combat Camera)

**Soldiers from A/1-10 FA raid the house of a suspected insurgent in the Baqubah Province on 15 March 2005.**

and NCOs went to the Diyala Provincial Police Station to live and work with the Iraqis. The goal was to enhance the skills of the Iraqi police along major LOOs: training, intelligence, law enforcement, communications, personnel, contracting and logistics. This team was designated TF Five-O and became the BCT's lead agent to develop the Iraqi police service in the Diyala Province. The operations of TF Five-O were truly a collaborative effort as the TF was augmented with US subject matter experts (SMEs) in the primary fields of emphasis. The SMEs came from the 42nd Infantry Division (New York Army National Guard), to which the 3rd BCT was attached, and the 411th Civil Affairs Battalion (in support of the 42nd ID).

The Diyala Provincial Police Station is in a habitually troublesome part of Baqubah, and an engineer company attached to TF 1-10 manned it fulltime to provide force protection and life support to US personnel in the facility. An attached US military police (MP) squad also was located at the police station permanently. It helped with and improved the Iraqi Criminal Investigation Division (CID) procedures and policies in the investigation and processing of inmates.

The 24-hour mission of TF Five-O included the development of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training, detainee handling and processing, investigations training, contracting support, provincial jail oversight, administration support, training academy oversight, joint coordination center (JCC) op-

erations and logistics oversight. Each subject area had a captain and a senior NCO in charge who interacted daily with the Iraqi police officers to move their systems along and give them the tools to become self-reliant.

**CMO.** In the Diyala Province, specifically in Baqubah and Buhriz, CMO presented unique challenges. The demographics of the region are potentially explosive: 40 percent Sunni, 40 percent Shiite and 20 percent Kurd and other assorted ethnic groups. Baqubah and its surrounding area were largely unaffected by major combat operations during the US-led invasion in 2003; however, the insurgency and years of neglect under the previous regime left the region lacking nearly all remnants of a stable society.

Although great progress had been made during 2004 in improving the security situation and setting the conditions for the first national elections (January 2005), at the beginning of 2005, it was clear that the lack of a basic infrastructure and absence of a functional local government impeded the advance of US campaign objectives. The first priority was to understand the scope of the problems in the region and what was possible to accomplish in the span of the one-year deployment. It was critical to measure conditions in the area to devise a plan for progress.

One stepping stone in the process was simple, but effective. The sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical and security (SWEAT-MS) model was a way not only to understand conditions

in and around Baqubah, but also to track completed, ongoing and planned reconstruction projects and focus full-spectrum operations. By graphically representing each of these factors using satellite imagery, PowerPoint and a simple color scheme depicting projects, their statuses and affected areas, the TF formed a picture of the AO that had not existed in the past. This picture would not have been possible without first having developed strong relationships with the local Iraqi leaders.

The Mayor of Baqubah emerged as a strong, effective leader who was willing to work with Coalition Forces to improve the conditions of his city and his people as well as advance his political ambitions. Working with the mayor and regional councils, the TF brought in local ministry directors from the Iraqi government to lend their insights and analyze the conditions in the area, locate key facilities and identify the most neglected areas. In doing so, it became apparent how the TF would prioritize reconstruction funding and which projects would have the most impact in the AOR.

The SWEAT-MS model also came to include other categories, such as roads and bridges, sports and recreation, government and emergency (fire and police) facilities and polling-site conditions. The result was more than 70 major reconstruction projects completed in excess of \$60 million that physically transformed the city in less than nine months. Projects funded with Coalition resources made roads safer by paving and lighting them, reopened schools and clinics, supplied the city with water from newly built fresh-water treatment plants, completed sewage systems, built checkpoints for the ISF, installed electrical networks and brought pride to the populace through a city-wide sanitation program.

As progress became more coordinated and effectively planned, it was easier to focus on conditions that could have a positive impact on future operations in the region rather than just infrastructure emergencies.

Further "sub-LOOs" included political, economic and democracy development. From these broad initiatives, objectives evolved that required sub-goals and tasks.

Political development included a weekly "battle rhythm" meeting with the Mayors of Baqubah and Buhriz, the city and *qadah* (equivalent to an American county) councils and key officials of



the various government ministries. The agenda covered what the TF sought to accomplish by the end of the one-year deployment as well as long-term goals. Every week, this group revisited the items discussed and addressed recent major events. This resulted in establishing city councils in both Baqubah and Buhriz, creating a *qadah* council that seated representatives of the surrounding *nahias* (rural neighborhoods) and writing the first charter for the Baqubah Qadah and submitting it to the province for legislative and judicial review in advance of a local referendum.

Economic development sought to revive an area that had a strong agricultural and industrial base and establish basic and transparent financial practices at local banks and in local government. All managers of major banks in Baqubah agreed to apply practices that would lower interest rates on loans, encourage individual savings accounts, use electronic banking procedures and accept checks for reconstruction projects in Iraqi *dinars* rather than US dollars.

Through extensive work with the mayors, councils and representatives of the various ministries, the first-ever municipal operating budget for Baqubah was drafted and submitted to the provincial and national Ministry of Finance.

Democracy development focused on the success of both the Iraqi constitutional referendum and the national elections in October and December, respectively, and improving the poor voter turnout experienced in January 2005. The TF engaged and mentored officials from the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), the group responsible for conducting the elections, and merged their planning considerations with those of the ISF with the assistance of local officials. The result was a 600-percent decrease in elections-related violence, 200-percent increase in voter registration and 300-percent increase in voter turnout with 100 percent of the polling sites opened and no major insurgent attacks during both the referendum and the national elections.

The key to achieving successful CMO objectives in OIF III was identifying and assessing conditions, setting realistic goals across a definable range of critical LOOs and integrating those goals with combat and overall campaign objectives. Internally resourcing the TF S5 section with senior leaders and coordinating the use of attached CA teams and PSYOP and

IO assets under the S5 set the groundwork to create a nonlethal effects-based staff that had the mission and skills to achieve the Army's goals in Iraq.

Working closely with the State Department, US Army Corps of Engineers, non-governmental organizations and local Iraqi leaders brought to bear a broad range of capabilities and means for measurable CMO progress in Baqubah and Buhriz.

*IO.* While conducting full-spectrum operations in AO *Rock* during OIF III, TF 1-10 used IO as an integral part of operations against the AIF. At the TF level, IO focused on building public support for the ISF and Iraqi government while dislocating the AIF from the people. Company/battery FSOs were the IO representatives at the company/battery level.

For continuity purposes, the TFFSO/IO officer was part of the S5 section. His main mission during OIF III was to help coordinate media events, including those related to local stories and those that involved US Armed Forces. It was important to the leadership to publicize how well the ISF conducted operations.

The TFFSO/IO officer sent daily news releases and stories to the BCT IO section. He coordinated the distribution of fliers depicting the successes of the ISF and Iraqi government during Coalition and Iraqi operations. Fliers and posters also informed the citizens of Baqubah about the constitutional referendum in October and the national elections in December and encouraged them to participate in the political process. Baqubah had more than 65 percent of the voters take part in the October referendum and the December national election.

When special events occurred, such as the opening of a new or refurbished water plant, the IO officer and the S5 section arranged for media coverage at the event. The highest ranking Iraqi civilian authority available also was present. We used every opportunity to give the Iraqis credit where credit was due, supporting the development of effective local leaders.

The TF also conducted specific IO missions aimed at educating the Iraqi people. These missions, always conducted with the ISF and eventually led by the ISF, ranged from handing out fliers in neighborhoods to holding town hall-type meetings in communities to broadcasting messages through loudspeaker trucks and over the commercial radio. These missions proved effective at helping

the local people see their government and security forces no longer as instruments of oppression, but as institutions of public good.

Building on the progress of the great units that preceded it, TF 1-10 was able to synchronize and execute multiple complex operations in the Baqubah area by LOOs. Each element of the TF's collective skill sets (artillerymen, infantrymen, tankers, engineers and a host of supporting military occupational specialties) combined to ensure that we accomplished the mission and Soldiers returned home safely. The TF 1-10 leadership adapted the LOOs to suit the specific needs of the mission and, again, proved that the American Artillery is still the *King of Battle. Rock Support!*

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**Captain Ryan A. Latham** currently is the Battalion Training Officer for 1-10 FA. During OIF III, he served in TF Five-O, helping the Iraqi Police Service in Diyala create a functioning logistics system.

**Captain Patrick C. Moffett** was the Assistant Operations Officer for all pre-deployment training and deployed in support of OIF III as the Battalion Planner for TF 1-10. He took command of A Battery, *Automatic Steel*, in July 2005, and commanded the battery for the remainder of the deployment.

**Captain Neil A. Orechiwsky** was the TF S5 Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Officer during OIF III and was the primary architect of the TF 1-10's CMO.

**Captain Jason R. Staraitis** was the TF 1-10 S2 during OIF III and remains in that position in 1-10 FA. He led the TF's effects-based targeting process.